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This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilib-
rium in general stochastic games with noise — a component of the state
that is nonatomically distributed and not directly aﬀected by the previous
period’s state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoﬀ irrelevant public
randomization device, delivering known results on existence of correlated
equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of
shocks that enter into players’ stage payoﬀs and the transition probability
on states. The existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics
and to a model of dynamic partisan electoral competition.
1 Introduction
This paper proves existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in a class
of stochastic games, a subset of dynamic games in which isomorphic subgames
are indexed by a state variable that evolves according to a controlled Markov
process. In each period, the current state is publicly observed and determines a
stage game in which players simultaneously choose feasible actions, stage pay-
oﬀs are realized, and a new state is drawn from a distribution depending on
the current state and the players’ actions. A natural starting point for strate-
gic analysis in this setting is to consider equilibria that reﬂect the stationary
structure of the environment, and so the issue of existence of stationary Markov
perfect equilibria in general stochastic games is of central importance. I estab-
lish existence of equilibrium in the standard framework by adding noise — a
component of the state state variable that is nonatomically distributed and not
directly aﬀected by the previous period’s state and actions — in each period.
I refer to games for which such a decomposition of states is possible as “noisy
stochastic games.” The presence of such noise is often innocuous from an applied
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1point of view, where shocks to parameters of the game can increase modeling
realism and are desirable for purposes of estimation. I give two examples to
illustrate the application of the existence theorem: one is a dynamic model of
entry, exit, and investment of ﬁrms in an industry, where the noise component
corresponds to demand or technology shocks, and another is a dynamic model
of partisan electoral competition with time-consistent policy choice, where noise
is introduced via probabilistic voting, a standard assumption in the literature.
The literature on stochastic games has not yielded general existence results,
even under the compactness and continuity conditions familiar from Debreu
(1952), Fan (1952), and Glicksberg (1952) for static games. Indeed, the example
in Section 2.1 of Harris et al. (1995) shows that compactness and continuity are
not suﬃcient for existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in stochastic
games. That example is a relatively simple, two-period game in which the play-
ers’ action sets are compact and payoﬀs are continuous in each stage. Though
not constructed explicitly as a stochastic game, the example can be formulated
as one in which the state in the ﬁrst period is an exogenous initial state, and
the state in the second period is just the proﬁle of actions taken in the ﬁrst;
then the mapping from action proﬁles in period 1 to the state in period 2 is just
the identity mapping. The authors argue that there is no subgame perfect equi-
librium in their example, and therefore there is no Markov perfect equilibrium
when the game is viewed as a stochastic game. One approach, taken by Harris
et al. (1995), is to consider correlated equilibria in history-dependent strategies.
Another approach, followed in the literature on stochastic games, is to
strengthen the continuity properties of the transition probability. At issue is the
fact that even if stage payoﬀs are continuous, discontinuities can conceivably be
introduced by strategic behavior of the players, for players tomorrow may con-
dition their responses to today’s actions in a discontinuous way. The literature
has accordingly assumed that next period’s state is determined stochastically as
a function of the current period’s state and actions, and that the distribution of
next period’s state varies with current actions in a strongly continuous way, e.g.,
the probability of each measurable set of next period’s states is continuous in
this period’s actions. This precludes deterministic transitions, as in the exam-
ple of Harris et al. (1995), and it partially addresses the problem of continuity
in dynamic games. This stochastic element does not, however, automatically
deliver general results on existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, for
diﬃcult technical problems arise when the set of states is uncountably inﬁnite.
Then existence arguments (implicitly or explicitly) involve Bochner integration
of Banach-valued correspondences, and in contrast to integrals of correspon-
dences mapping to ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space, the Bochner integral is
not necessarily upper hemicontinuous in its parameters (even if the correspon-
dence being integrated is), and it need not be convex (even if the integrating
measure is nonatomic).1 To obtain these properties, the correspondence being
integrated must have convex values: in inﬁnite-dimensional ﬁxed point argu-
1See Example 6.1 in Yannelis (1991) for discussion of these points.
2ments, the role of convexity is intertwined with upper hemicontinuity.
The papers in the extant literature closest to the current one are Nowak
and Raghavan (1992), who prove the existence of correlated stationary Markov
perfect equilibria, and Duﬃe et al. (1994), who additionally deduce ergodicity of
equilibrium under stronger conditions. These papers essentially assume that the
players observe the outcome of a public randomization device before choosing
their actions in each period, convexifying payoﬀs in every state and delivering
the convexityneeded to obtain upper hemicontinuity needed for their arguments.
The drawback of this approach is that the “sunspot” on which players coordinate
is payoﬀ irrelevant and may be unnatural or unmotivated in some applications.
The innovation of the current paper is to replace sunspots with shocks that
appear explicitly as a component of the state, along with a standard component,
and that enter into the stage payoﬀs of the players and the transition probability
on states. I refer to these shocks as a “noise” component of the state, because in
contrast to the standard component, the distribution of noise next period is not
directly aﬀected by this period’s state and actions. (The noise component can be
correlated with the standard component, which allows for indirect dependence
on the state and actions this period.) The noise component could be simply an
iid draw of a payoﬀ-irrelevant, continuously distributed random variable, i.e., a
public randomization device, thereby obtaining the existence results of Nowak
and Raghavan (1992) and Duﬃe et al. (1994) as a special case. More generally,
the noise component can aﬀect stage payoﬀs and the state transition, and it
arises naturally in many applications, where transitory shocks are desirable on
modeling grounds or for purposes of estimation. Even so, it delivers the needed
convexity for the existence proof.
The usefulness of the noise component is that it permits the ﬁxed point ar-
gument to be framed in the space of “interim” continuation values, which are
deﬁned over the standard component alone. The players’ interim continuation
values can be written as an iterated integral — the outer integral over the noise
component of the state, and the inner integral over the players’ actions — and
integration over the non-atomic noise component functions then serves to con-
vexify the correspondence from interim continuation values to updated interim
continuation values. The iterated integral approach is also used by Chakrabarti
(1999) in the proof of his Theorem 4 on the existence of stationary equilibria
that are semi-Markovian, i.e., players are allowed to condition not just on the
current state but also on the previous period’s state and actions. There, the
ﬁxed point argument takes place in the space of “ex ante” continuation values
deﬁned over the previous state and actions, the outside integral is over the cur-
rent state, and the inside integral is over the players’ actions. Assuming the
current state is non-atomically distributed, the integration over today’s state
convexiﬁes the correspondence of updated ex ante continuation values. Thus,
although Chakrabarti’s assumptions and results are diﬀerent, there is a connec-
tion between the results at a technical level.
Section 2 provides a review of the stochastic games literature. Section 3
3presents the noisy stochastic game model and the main existence theorem. In
Section 4, I present two applications of the existence theorem, one oriented
toward industrial organization and the other toward political economy. Section
5 is devoted to an informal discussion of the proof approach. And Section 6
contains the proof of the main theorem.
2 Literature Review
Existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is a central issue in the liter-
ature on stochastic games beginning with Shapley (1953), who proved existence
for ﬁnite, two-player, zero-sum games. Existence in general ﬁnite stochastic
games follows from the straightforward application of Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem in ﬁnite dimensions (cf. Fink (1964), Rogers (1969), and Sobel (1971)),
while Takahashi (1964) proves existence when the set of states is ﬁnite and
action sets are compact. Haller and Lagunoﬀ (2000) prove that the set of sta-
tionary Markov perfect equilibria in ﬁnite games is generically ﬁnite; Herings
and Peeters (2004) develop an algorithm for computation of equilibrium and
use homotopy arguments to show that the number of equilibria is odd; and Do-
raszelski and Escobar (2010) prove generic strong stability and puriﬁability of
stationary equilibria. Parthasarathy (1973) extends the framework of Shapley
to two-player, non-zero sum games with ﬁnite action sets and a countable set of
states, and Himmelberg et al. (1976) consider two-player, non-zero-sum games
with uncountable state and action sets.
General results on existence have been elusive and have relied on the imposi-
tion of relatively special structure or departures from the concept of stationary
equilibrium,2 and all of the known results impose some form of strong continu-
ity on transition probabilities. Letting s denote a state and a denote a proﬁle
of actions, a transition probability is a measurable mapping (s,a) →  t( |s,a)
from state-action pairs to a probability measure on the set of states that can
conceivably vary with the time period t. Next, in increasing strength, are some
assumptions used in the literature.
(A1)  t is set-wise continuous in a,3
(A2)  t is norm-continuous in a,4
(A3)  t is norm-continuous in a and absolutely continuous with respect to some
ﬁxed probability measure νt,
2Dutta and Sundaram (1998) provide a lucid review of much of the literature on stochastic
games and the problem of existence of stationary Markov perfect quilibrium.
3For each measurable set Z of states and sequence am → a, µ(Z|s,am) → µ(Z|s,a).
4For each sequence am → a, µ(Z|s,am) → µ(Z|s,a) uniformly over measurable sets Z of
states.
4(A4)  t is norm-continuous in a and absolutely continuous with respect to a
ﬁxed, non-atomic probability measure νt,
(A5)  t has a density f(s′|s,a) with respect to Lebesgue measure that is con-
tinuous with respect to a.
In the analysis of stationary stochastic games, as in the current paper, it is
further assumed that the transition probability is ﬁxed across time and the
subscript dropped. Note that even the weakest of the above assumptions, (A1),
is inconsistent with deterministic transitions (precluding the example of Harris
et al. (1995)) when action sets are uncountably inﬁnite. Of course, (A1) and
(A2) hold when the players’ action sets are ﬁnite.
In ﬁnite-horizon stochastic games, Rieder (1979) proves existence of Markov
perfect equilibrium under (A1). By incorporating time in the state variable of
a ﬁnite-horizon game, we may in fact view Rieder’s equilibrium as stationary.
Parthasarathy (1973) proves existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
with ﬁnite action sets and countable state space, and assuming (A1), Federgruen
(1978), Whitt (1980), and Escobar (2006) prove existence for countable state
spaces and uncountable action sets. Himmelberg et al. (1976) prove existence of
stationary p-equilibria for two-player games with an uncountable state space but
assuming ﬁnite action sets and strong separability conditions on stage payoﬀs
and the transition probability.5 Parthasarathy (1982) gives additional condi-
tions under which the result of the latter paper delivers a stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium. Existence of equilibrium for multi-player games with un-
countable state space is proved in Parthasarathy and Sinha (1989) under the
assumptions of ﬁnite action sets and state-independent transitions.6 Under
continuity assumptions on the transition probability akin to (A5), Amir (1996,
2002)), Curtat (1996), and Nowak (2007) prove existence of stationary Markov
perfect equilibria in games possessing strategic complementarities with uncount-
able state and action spaces.7 Assuming that the state transition is a convex
combination of a ﬁxed ﬁnite set of probability measures, Nowak (2003) gives
suﬃcient conditions related to (A1) for existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Otherwise more general results have been obtained by weakening stationarity
or considering weaker notions of equilibrium. Most closely related to the current
paper, Nowak and Raghavan (1992) prove existence of stationary Markov per-
fect equilibria with public randomization under (A3), and Duﬃe et al. (1994)
add mutual absolute continuity of transition probabilities and show that the
5Here, p is a probability measure on states, and a p-equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle such
that players optimize at all but perhaps a set of states with p-measure zero.
6The transition to next period’s state depends only on current actions, not the current
state. Additionally, the authors assume state transitions are non-atomic.
7Nowak (2007) also gives conditions based on concavity of the stage game and a decomposi-
tion of the transition probability. Other work restricts the way in which players’ actions aﬀect
each others’ payoﬀs, e.g., Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988), Bergin and Bernhardt (1992), and
Horst (2005).
5equilibrium induces an ergodic process. Mertens and Parthasarathy assume
(A2) and obtain existence of equilibria that are nearly Markovian. Mertens and
Parthasarathy (1991) assume ﬁnite action sets and deduce existence of equilibria
in which the players’ strategies in period t can depend not only on the current
state but the previous state as well. Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987, 2003)
allow for inﬁnite action sets and deduce equilibria in which players use history-
dependent strategies such that each player’s mixture over actions is the same
following any two histories ending in the same state and generating identical
continuation values. Increasing (A2) to (A4), Chakrabarti (1999) proves exis-
tence of a stationary equilibrium in semi-Markov perfect strategies, which allow
players to condition not only on the current state, but the previous period’s
state and actions as well.
Building on Rieder’s (1979) result for ﬁnite-horizon games, Dutta and Sun-
daram (1998) give a simple proof of the existence of (possibly non-stationary)
Markov perfect ǫ-equilibria under (A1). Assuming stage utilities and the state
transition are continuous in the state variable, Whitt (1980) gives suﬃcient
conditions related to (A2) for existence of a Markov perfect ǫ-equilibrium in
stationary strategies, and Nowak (1985) drops continuity of the state transition
in the state variable and increases (A2) to (A4) to obtain a stationary Markov
perfect ǫ-equilibrium.
3 Existence Theorem
A stochastic game is a list Γ = (N,(S,S),(Xi,Ai,ui,δi)i∈N, ), where N is a
ﬁnite set of n players, (S,S) is a measurable space of states, Xi is a compact
metric space of actions for player i, with X =
 
i∈N Xi, Ai: S ⇉ Xi is a lower
measurable correspondence from S into nonempty, compact feasible sets Ai(s)
of actions for player i,8 ui: S × X → ℜ is a bounded, measurable stage-payoﬀ
function with ui(s,a) continuous in a = (a1,...,an) ∈ X for each state s,
player i’s discount factor is δi ∈ [0,1), and  : S × A × S → [0,1] is a transition
probability, where  (Z|s,a) is the probability that next period’s state belongs
to Z, given state s and action proﬁle a in the current period. Write u(s,a) =
(u1(s,a),...,un(s,a)) for the vector of stage payoﬀs of the players. This is the
standard deﬁnition of a general stochastic game.
The next step is to introduce a noise structure into the model. To this
end, assume that (i) the set of states can be decomposed as S = Q × R and
S = Q ⊗ R, where Q and R are complete, separable metric spaces and Q and R
are the respective Borel sigma-algebras. Letting  q( |s,a) denote the marginal
of  ( |s,a) on q, assume that (ii)  q( |s,a) is absolutely continuous with respect
to a ﬁxed probability measure κ on (Q,Q). Moreover, assume that (iii) for each
s and each sequence {am} of action proﬁles converging to some a, the sequence
8That is, for every open set G ⊆ Xi, the set {s ∈ S | Ai(s) ∩ G  = ∅} belongs to S.
6{ q( |s,am)} converges to  q( |s,a) in the total variation norm. Thus, the ﬁrst
component of the state satisﬁes the typical norm-continuity condition assumed
in the literature.
Furthermore, assume that (iv) conditional on next period’s q′, the dis-
tribution of r′ next period is independent of the current state and actions.
Speciﬁcally, letting  r( |s,a,q′) denote a version of the distribution of r′ given
state-action pair (s,a) today and conditional on q′ next period, assume that
 r(Z|s,a,q′) =  r(Z|s′,a′,q′) for all Z ∈ R, all s,s′ ∈ S, all a,a′ ∈ X, and all
q′ ∈ Q. Accordingly, I write  r( |q) for the distribution of r conditional on the
realization of q in a given period, which is well-deﬁned up to sets of κ-measure
zero. Assume that (v) for κ-almost all q,  r( |q) has a density h(r|q) with re-
spect to a ﬁxed, atomless probability measure λ on (R,R) and that h(r|q) is
jointly measurable in (r,q). For later use, deﬁne the product probability measure
ν = κ ⊗ λ. A noisy stochastic game is a stochastic game satisfying conditions
(i)–(v).
A stationary Markov strategy for i is a measurable mapping σi: S → P(Xi),
where σi(s) is a probability measure on Xi that places probability one on Ai(s).9
Given a strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,...,σn), let σ(s) denote the product proba-
bility measure σ1(s) ⊗     ⊗ σn(s) over action vectors induced by the players’
strategies, taking Borel measurable sets of action vectors in the argument of
σ( |s).10 Continuation values v( ;σ), which are placed in the set Ln
1(S,S,ν) of














A strategy vector σ is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if each agent i’s















for all i and all s, where σ−i(s) is the product probability measure σ1(s) ⊗
   ⊗σi−1(s)⊗σi+1(s)⊗   ⊗σn(s) over vectors a−i of actions of players other
than i. By the one-shot deviation principle, every stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium is, in particular, subgame perfect.
Theorem: Every noisy stochastic game possesses a stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium.
9I use the convention that given any separable metric space, P( ) denotes the set of Borel
probability measures endowed with the weak* topology.
10By Theorem 4.44 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), the Borel sigma-algebra on action
proﬁles is the product of Borel sigma-algebra’s on the players’ action sets.
7A special case of interest is the situation in which r is identically and indepen-
dently distributed across periods and ui is constant in r, so the noise component
of the state is payoﬀ-irrelevant. Then r acts as a public randomization device,
and every stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the model can be viewed as
a correlated equilibrium in the sense of Nowak and Raghavan (1992) or Duﬃe
et al. (1994), and visa versa. Thus, for any stochastic game satisfying the as-
sumptions of the latter papers, we can extend the game by specifying a noise
component r uniformly and independently distributed in each state (and stage
payoﬀs constant in r) to obtain a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the
extended game, which delivers a correlated equilibrium of the original game.
But the formulation of this paper allows for noise that is payoﬀ relevant, which
captures many economic and political models of interest.
4 Applications
4.1 Firm Exit, Entry, and Investment
This subsection provides a dynamic model of entry, exit, and investment in an
industry. Each period begins with a set of ﬁrms active in the market, a vector
of capital stocks for each ﬁrm, and a vector of demand or technology shocks.
Each ﬁrm, active or inactive, must decide whether to enter or exit the industry,
and conditional on having entered in the previous period, a ﬁrm must choose a
production plan. The ﬁrms’ output and investment plans determine proﬁts for
the current period and a distribution over capital stocks next period, reﬂecting
uncertain depreciation and returns to investment. The model is comparable
to those of Hopenhayn (1992) or Bergin and Bernhardt (2008), where ﬁrms
make entry and exit decisions over time and are subject to exogenous technol-
ogy shocks. In contrast, those models assume a continuum of price-taking ﬁrms,
while here there is a (possibly large) ﬁnite number of ﬁrms competing oligopolis-
tically; and those models either ﬁx capital or treat it as a variable input, while
here ﬁrms make investment decisions and accumulate capital over time. In fact,
ﬁrms’ production plans and capital stocks can be multidimensional, and a ﬁrm’s
decisions can aﬀect future production technology through current investment,
so that technology evolves endogenously.
Formally, let N be a ﬁnite set of n ﬁrms (or potential ﬁrms) in an industry,
and suppose that in each period, ﬁrms must decide whether to enter or remain in
the market and, conditional on having previously entered the market, must make
output and investment decisions. At the beginning of any period, let z ∈ {0,1}n
summarize the ﬁrms active in the industry, with zi = 1 indicating that i is
active and zi = 0 indicating i is inactive; let ki ∈ ℜℓ
+ denote the capital stock
of ﬁrm i and k = (k1,...,kn) the vector of stocks; and let r = (r1,...,rm) be
a vector of shocks to demand or production technology belonging to a compact
subset R ⊆ ℜm with positive Lebesgue measure. For tractability, the level
8of capital stock of each ﬁrm is bounded above by k in each coordinate. The
state of the industry is then summarized by the state variable (z,k,r), where
(z,k) is inﬂuenced by the actions of the ﬁrms, and r is distributed identically
and independently across periods. A decision for ﬁrm i is a pair (ei,pi), where
ei ∈ {0,1} is ﬁrm i’s entry/exit decision, with ei = 1 indicating i is will be
in the market next period, and pi ∈ ℜd is a multidimensional production plan
for ﬁrm i. In state (z,k,r), the set of feasible production plans for ﬁrm i is a
nonempty, compact subset φi(z,k,r) ⊆ ℜd, where φi: {0,1}n×[0,k]nℓ×R ⇉ ℜd
is lower measurable with compact range ˜ Xi ⊆ ℜd. When ﬁrm i is inactive, i.e.,
zi = 0, assume that φi(z,k,r) = {0} to indicate that the ﬁrm makes no output
or investment decision. Then the decisions available to ﬁrm i in state (z,k,r)
are (ei,pi) ∈ {0,1}×φi(z,k,r), and the vector of ﬁrm decisions is denoted (e,p).
Given current state (z,k,r) and actions (e,p), next period’s state, denoted
(z′,k′,r′), is determined as follows. Entry and exit decisions determine each
ﬁrm’s status next period, so z′ = e, while k′ is a random variable assumed to be
absolutely continuous with respect to a probability measure ˜ κ, deﬁned as the
product measure ˜ κ = ˜ κ1 ×     × ˜ κn, where ˜ κi is the equally weighted average
of the uniform distribution on [0,k]ℓ and the unit mass on zero. Denote the
density of k′ with respect to ˜ κ by ˜ g(k′|(z,k),(e,p)), which depends on the ﬁrms’
current capital stocks and decisions. Assume that for all k,k′ ∈ [0,k], the density
˜ g(k′|(z,k),(e,p)) is jointly measurable in its arguments, continuous in (e,p), and
independent of the current vector r of shocks. The distribution of next period’s
capital stock levels reﬂects the assumption that returns on investment to capital
stock are subject to uncertainty, and because ˜ κi places positive probability on
zero, the model allows for the possibility that the capital stock of an inactive
ﬁrm is ﬁxed at zero. Assume r′ ∈ R is identically and independently distributed
over time according to a density h with respect to Lebesgue measure.
A ﬁrm i remains active in a period if zi = ei = 1. Let πi((z,k,r),(ei,p))
be the proﬁt of a ﬁrm i that remains active given its own entry/exit decision
ei and production plans p in state (z,k,r), and assume πi((z,k,r),(ei,p)) is
bounded and jointly measurable in its arguments and continuous in (ei,p). The
payoﬀ of an active ﬁrm that decides to leave the market, i.e., zi = 1 = ei +1, is
ιi((z,k,r),(ei,p)), which may reﬂect the scrap value of a ﬁrm leaving the market.
Assume ιi((z,k,r),(ei,p)) is jointly measurable and continuous in (ei,p). The
payoﬀ of an inactive ﬁrm that decides to enter the market, i.e., zi = 0 = ei−1, is
αi(z,k,r), a measurable function that may reﬂect the setup cost of entry into the
market. The payoﬀ to an inactive ﬁrm that remains inactive, i.e., zi = ei = 0,
is zero. Payoﬀs are discounted over time by the factor δi for each ﬁrm.
Though formulated generally, the standard structure can be imposed on
these payoﬀs. In particular, it may be that capital ki is one-dimensional, that
r = (r1,...,rn,rn+1,rn+2) ∈ ℜn+2 consists of ﬁrm-speciﬁc production shocks
(r1,...,rn), an aggregate output demand shock rn+1, and an aggregate labor
supply shock rn+2, and that ﬁrms compete in a single output market. A produc-
tion plan is then a pair pi = (˙ ki,ℓi) consisting of levels of capital investment and
9labor input. Firm i’s output is then yi = Fi(ki + ˙ ki,ℓi,ri), total labor demand
is L =
 
i ℓi, and total output is Y =
 
i yi. The inverse demand for output is
given by P(Y,rn+1), and inverse supply of labor is W(L,rn+2). Then for ﬁrms
currently active in the market and remaining in the market next period, i.e.,
zi = ei = 1, we have









with appropriatecontinuity assumptions on the inverse demand and supply func-
tions, P and W, and bounds on output and investment to obtain compactness.
The industry then transitions to (z′,k′,r′), where z′ is determined by entry/exit
decisions, k′ is drawn from g(k′|(z,k),(e,p)) reﬂecting depreciation on capital
and returns to investment, and new shocks r′ are drawn independently from h.
At issue is the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in this
model, which is addressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 1: In the dynamic model of exit, entry, and investment,
there exists a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
To apply the main theorem of the paper, the model must be recast as a
stochastic game and conditions (i)–(v) in the deﬁnition of noisy stochastic game
veriﬁed. The set of players is N, and the set of states is S = Q × R, where
Q = {0,1}n×[0,k]nℓ and R is as above, both complete, separable metric spaces
endowed with their Borel sigma-algebras. The set of conceivable actions for ﬁrm
i is Xi = {0,1}× ˜ Xi, where ˜ Xi is a compact subset of ℜd. The correspondence of
feasible actions for ﬁrm i is deﬁned by Ai(s) = {0,1}×φ(z,k,r), which is lower
measurable with nonempty, compact values contained in Xi, and an action for





πi(s,(ei,p)) if zi = ei = 1
ιi(s,(ei,p)) if zi = 1,ei = 0,
αi(s) if zi = 0,ei = 1,
0 if zi = ei = 0,
which is bounded and measurable and is continuous in a. Discount factors are
as given in the original model. To deﬁne transition densities fulﬁlling the def-
inition of noisy stochastic game, let ˆ κ be the uniform distribution on {0,1}n,
and deﬁne κ = ˆ κ × ˜ κ. Let ˆ g( |e) be the unit mass on e, i.e., ˆ g(z|e) = 1 if
z = e and otherwise, ˆ g(z|e) = 0. Then, given q = (z,k), deﬁne the transition
density g( |s,a) by g(q′|s,a) = ˆ g(z′|e)˜ g(k′|(z,k),(e,p)) with respect to κ, which
is jointly measurable in (q′,s,a) and continuous in a, fulﬁlling (iii). Letting λ
10be the uniform distribution on R, which is nonatomic, and h be as given in the
original model, conditions (i)–(v) are satisﬁed, and the main existence theorem
directly yields Proposition 1.
4.2 Partisan Competition and Time-consistent Policy
This subsection provides a dynamic model of elections between two parties in
which parties cannot commit to policies prior to an election, and a representative
voter sequentially chooses between the two parties.11 At the beginning of each
period, a state of the economy e is given, the voter decides between the two
parties, and the winning party chooses a policy p in a policy space P ⊆ ℜd,
which then stochastically determines a new state prior to the election next
period. To apply the main theorem of the paper, I impose the further structure
that the voter’s preferences contain an idiosyncratic component that is realized
at the beginning of each period prior to the election but after the incumbent’s
policy choice while in oﬃce, so voting is probabilistic; consistent with that
assumption, the parties’ preferences are also subject to idiosyncratic shocks that
are unobserved by the voter at the time of the election. In equilibrium, because
they cannot commit, the parties use time-consistent policies, i.e., they choose
optimally given the voter’s expectations of their choices. In contrast to the
standard macroeconomic framework (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1977)), the
parties are in competition with each other, so a party’s optimization problem
also takes as given the expectations of the voters’ future choices between the
two parties and the opposing party’s future policy choices when elected.
An interesting incentive that arises in equilibrium is that each party will
seek to inﬂuence future economic states to its advantage. In particular, it may
be that one party seeks to “tie the hands” of the other, or to engender economic
states in which it is perceived favorably by the voter. The model has antecedents
in Alesina (1988), which considers repeated elections with probabilistic voting,
but there is no economic state variable in the setting of that paper; there,
voting behavior is black-boxed (and does not depend on expectations of the
voters of the parties’ policy choices); and Alesina considers equilibria in trigger
strategies, rather than stationary Markov perfect strategies. Also related is
Alesina (1987), who studies stationary equilibria in a model of macroeconomic
policy making, where the party in power chooses a level of monetary expansion
and rational wage setters anticipate monetary policy. There, however, parties
are myopic and voting behavior is exogenous. Dixit et al. (2000) analyze a
model in which farsighted parties compete in elections to divide a surplus, and
in which a state variable evolves according to an exogenous Markov process.
11The assumption of a representative voter is for tractability only. In the equilibrium anal-
ysis of voting, it is important that voters eliminate weakly dominated strategies, a reﬁnement
that does not generally hold in stationary Markov perfect equilibria. This problem could be
ﬁnessed in the stochastic game model by having voters vote sequentially, but it is simpler to
assume a representative voter.
11In contrast, the model of this subsection endogenizes voting behavior, and it
allows the possibility that current policy decisions inﬂuence future states. As
well, voting behavior is exogenous in their model, and those authors focus on
eﬃcient equilibria in history-dependent strategies.
Formally, let there be two parties, B and C, and a representative voter, V ,
and suppose that in each period, the voter must select one party, which then
makes a policy decision. Accordingly, each period is divided into two phases:
voting and policy making. At the beginning of any period, an economic state
e belonging to a subset E ⊆ ℜℓ is given, where E is compact and has positive
Lebesgue measure, and also given is a shock rV = (ǫB,ǫC) belonging to the
compact set RV = [0,1]×[0,1]. In the voting phase, the voter decides between
parties B and C by casting a ballot w ∈ {B,C}. A new economic state e′
is realized according to the density function ˜ g(e′|e,w), and preference shocks
rB,rC belonging to sets RB,RC ⊆ ℜm for the parties are then drawn from
the density ˜ h(rB,rC|e′), where RB and RC are assumed to be compact and to
have positive Lebesgue measure. In the policy making phase, the winning party,
w, chooses a policy p belonging to a compact subset P ⊆ ℜd. Finally a new
economic state e′′ is realized from the density ˜ g(e′′|w,e′,p), which is measurable
and assumed continuous in p, new shocks r′
V are drawn according to the density
˜ h(r′
V |e′′), and another election is held.
In the election phase, the voter receives payoﬀ ǫB if w = B and ǫC if w = C,
while the parties receive a zero payoﬀ. In the policy making phase, the voter
receives a payoﬀ uV (e′,p) from policy p in state e′, and the parties’ payoﬀs
are uB(e′,rB,p) and uC(e′,rC,p), where all stage utility functions are jointly
measurable and continuous in p. Payoﬀs are discounted after each period (at the
end of the policy making phase) by ˜ δV , ˜ δB, and ˜ δC, respectively, for the voter and
parties. In the voting phase, the voter must compare the current shocks ǫB and
ǫC from electing either party, together with the parties’ policy choices if elected
in the current period, plus the discounted future payoﬀs following the election
of either party. Thus, the voter’s shocks act to perturb the voter’s payoﬀs
from electing either party, and as is common in the literature on probabilistic
voting, we interpret these shocks as reﬂecting non-policy related attributes of
the parties (such as the charisma of the parties’ candidates) that are unobserved
at the time policies are chosen. In the simple formulation above, the economic
state e realized in the voting phase does not directly aﬀect payoﬀs; it is simply
a technical device that represents the voter’s information about the economic
state that will obtain in the subsequent policy making phase.
Proposition 2: In the dynamic model of partisan competition and time-
consistent policy, there exists a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
To apply the main theorem, this model must be reformulated as a noisy
stochastic game. The set of players is N = {V,B,C}, and the set of states is
S = Q×R, where Q = {V,B,C}×E and R = RV ∪(RB ×RC), both complete,
12separable metric spaces endowed with their Borel sigma-algebras. The sets of
conceivable actions are XB = XC = P for the parties, both compact subsets
of ℜd, and XV = {B,C} for the voter. The correspondence of feasible actions
is deﬁned, given s = (q,r) = ((i,e),r), as AV (s) = {B,C} when i = V , as
AB(s) = P when i = B, and as AC(s) = P when i = C; in states where
a player i is inactive, the set of actions of that player can be speciﬁed as an
arbitrary compact subset of Xi. Given (s,a), where s = (q,r) = ((i,e),r), stage
payoﬀs are deﬁned as
uV (s,a) =
 
ǫw if i = V and aV = w
1




0 if i = V
1
δBuB(e,rB,p) if i = B,C and ai = p,
and similarly for party C, and discount factors are the square roots, δi =
 
˜ δi,
of the original discount factors. A “period” in the stochastic game formulation
corresponds to a “phase” in the original model, so in contrast to the original,
discounting now must occur between the voting and policy making phases; this
is undone by using square roots of the original discount factors and by inﬂating
stage payoﬀs in the policy making stage accordingly.
To deﬁne transition densities as in the deﬁnition of noisy stochastic game,
let ˆ κ be uniform on {V,B,C} and ˜ κ be uniform on E, and deﬁne κ = ˆ κ × ˜ κ.
Given (s,a), where s = (q,r) = ((i,e),r), deﬁne the density on q′ = (i′,e′) with






˜ g(e′|e,w) if i = V , aV = w = i′
˜ g(e′|w,e,p) if i = w, aw = p, and i′ = V
0 else.
Thus, the ﬁrst coordinate of q tracks whether the game is in a voting phase
or policy making phase, and the transition on economic states is given by the
density ˜ g. This is jointly measurable and continuous in a. Let ˆ λ and ˜ λ be
uniform on RV and RB × RC, respectively, and let λ = 1
2
ˆ λ + 1
2
˜ λ, which is
nonatomic. Given q = (i,e), deﬁne
h(r|q) =
  ˜ h(rV |e) if i = V ,
˜ h(rB,rC|e) if i = B,C.
This veriﬁes conditions (i)–(v), and the main existence theorem implies Propo-
sition 2.
5 Discussion of Proof
To describe the method of proof, I begin with the ﬁxed point of argument







Figure 1: Correlation approach
perfect equilibrium with public randomization. The argument takes place in a
compact, convex space V of continuation values v: S → ℜn. Given v, we deﬁne
the induced game Γv(s) with actions Ai(s) and payoﬀs




Assuming the transition  ( |s,a) is norm-continuous in a, these payoﬀs are con-
tinuous in actions, and the theorem of Debreu (1952)-Fan (1952)-Glicksberg
(1952) implies that there is at least one mixed strategy equilibrium of the in-
duced game. Let Pv(s) be the set of mixed strategy equilibrium payoﬀ vectors
of the induced game, and let P ∗
v (s) be the convex hull of that set. To update
continuation values, take all selections v′ from the correspondence s → P ∗
v (s).
This gives us a nonempty-valued correspondence v → Ev pictured in Figure 1.
Because we are selecting from the convex hull of induced equilibrium payoﬀs,
Ev is clearly convex. Closed graph of v → Ev follows from both continuity
assumptions imposed on the model and convex values of the correspondence;
if v → Ev is not convex-valued, then closed graph does not follow. Thus, the
correspondence v → Ev has a ﬁxed point v∗ ∈ E(v∗), and equilibrium strategies
can be backed out from v∗, with care to ensure measurability.
The role of public randomization in convexifying equilibrium payoﬀs in in-
duced games is critical in the above argument. To eschew correlation, I employ
a nonatomically distributed noise component of the state. The argument now
takes place in a compact, convex set V of “interim” continuation values, which
are conditioned only on the realization of the standard component q, rather
than the full state. To convey this notion more precisely, I deﬁne the interim


























Figure 2: Noise approach
where s = (q,r). Given interim continuation value v, deﬁne the induced game
Γv(s) with actions Ai(s) and payoﬀs




which are continuous in actions by norm-continuity of  q( |s,a) in a. Let Pv(s)
be the mixed strategy equilibrium payoﬀs in Γv(s), which need not be convex.
To update continuation values, for each s = (q,r), choose an element of
Pv(s). Intuitively, we then integrate across the noise component r to get a new
interim continuation value v′. Repeating this for all possible ways of selecting
from induced equilibrium payoﬀs, we deﬁne a correspondence v → Ev that maps
any v to a set Ev of updated interim continuation values. The crux of the proof is
to formalize this idea and establish the usual properties of this correspondence
in order to deduce a ﬁxed point. Technically, to deﬁne this correspondence,
we take a selection φ(r): Q → ℜn for each r of density-weighted equilibrium
payoﬀs, i.e., for a.e. q, φ(r)(q) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). Then, given the measurable
mapping φ: R → V , the Bochner integral v′ =
 
r φ(r)λ(dr) provides a new
interim continuation value, and we repeat this procedure for each function φ
taking selections of density-weighted equilibrium payoﬀs. More formally, letting
Φv(r) be the set of density-weighted equilibrium payoﬀ selections at r, the set
of updated continuation values is Ev =
 
r Φv(r)λ(dr), the Bochner integral of
the correspondence Φv.
The key to the proof is establishing that v → Ev has convex values and
closed graph. Both properties rely on the observation that Ev can be equiva-
lently deﬁned by integrating over selections from P ∗
v (s). That is, letting Φ∗
v(r)
be the set of density-weighted mixtures of equilibrium payoﬀ selections as a
function of q, we have Ev =
 
Φ∗






Figure 3: Applying Liapunov
ceeds by arbitrarily choosing v′ ∈
 
r Φ∗
v(r)λ(dr) and considering each q sepa-
rately. For almost all q, we have v′(q) ∈
 
r h(r|q)P ∗
v (q,r)λ(dr). Given such
q, the correspondence h( |q)Pv(q, ): R → ℜn may have non-convex values,
as depicted in Figure 3, but it maps to ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space.






v (q,r)λ(dr), and in particular, there is
a mapping φ(q): R → ℜn that is measurable on R, integrates to v′(q), and
is an almost everywhere selection from h( |q)Pv(q, ). The selections φ(q) are
chosen independently for each q, and so the mapping φ: Q → V so-deﬁned
need not be measurable, but the theorem of Artstein (1989) allows us to “sew”
these selections together in a measurable way, giving us v′ ∈
 
r Φv(r)λ(dr), as
required. Then, using the fact that v → Φ∗
v has convex values and closed graph,
an inﬁnite-dimensional Fatou’s lemma due to Yannelis (1990) implies closed
graph of the correspondence v → Ev. Therefore, v → Ev possesses a ﬁxed point
v∗ ∈ Ev∗, and the ﬁnal step of the proof is to back out equilibrium strategies
corresponding to this value.
6 Proof of the Theorem
The formal proof of existence must initially work with functions that are mea-
surable with respect to the completion of λ. Let R∗ denote the sigma-algebra
of λ-measurable sets, and let the completion of λ be λ∗, the unique extension
of λ to R∗. Since λ is nonatomic, so is λ∗. Endow Ln
2 ≡ Ln
2(Q,Q,κ) with the
weak*, or equivalently the weak, topology σ(Ln
2,Ln
2). Let V be the subset of all
κ-equivalence classes of functions v ∈ Ln
2 such that ||v(q)|| ≤ C for κ-almost all
q, where C is a ﬁxed constant such that ||u(s,a)|| ≤ C for all s and a. Obviously,
V is nonempty and convex, and it follows from Alaoglu’s theorem (see Theorem
6.21 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)) that V is compact. Henceforth, universal
16quantiﬁers over continuation value functions are understood to range over V .
For each v ∈ V , let Γv(s) be the stage game induced by v at s, where player
i’s action space is Ai(s) and i’s payoﬀ from a is




let U(s,a;v) = (U1(s,a;v),...,Un(s,a;v)) be the vector of payoﬀs, and note
from norm-continuity of  q( |s,a) in a that U(s,a;v) is continuous in actions.
A mixed strategy for player i in Γv(s) is a Borel probability measure αi ∈ P(Xi)
such that αi(Ai(s)) = 1, and mixed strategies for all players determine the prod-
uct probability measure α = α1 ⊗     ⊗ αn ∈
 
i P(Xi). The space
 
i P(Xi)
of product probability measures is endowed with the relative weak* topology
inherited from P(
 
i Xi), so convergence of a sequence {αm} to α = α1⊗   ⊗αn
is equivalent to convergence of the marginals {αm
i } to αi, i = 1,...,n. Deﬁne
the extension U( ;v): S ×
 
i P(Xi) → ℜn to mixed strategies in the induced
game by U(s,α;v) =
 
a U(s,a;v)α(da), with the relative topology on
 
i P(Xi)
induced by the weak* topology on P(X). By continuity of U(s,α;v) in α and
compactness of each P(Xi), the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg theorem implies that the
set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of Γv(s), denoted Nv(s), is a nonempty,
compact subset of
 
i P(Xi). Let Pv(s) denote the payoﬀs generated by equi-
libria in Nv(s), i.e., Pv(s) = U(s,Nv(s);v) = {U(s,α;v) | α ∈ Nv(s)}. By
continuity of U(s,α;v) in α, Pv(s) is compact. The ﬁrst lemma, reproduced
from Lemma 5 of Nowak and Raghavan (1992), establishes that the correspon-
dence of mixed strategy equilibria is lower measurable in the state, i.e., for every
open set G ⊆ P(X), the set {s ∈ S | Nv(s) ∩ G  = ∅} belongs to S.
Lemma 1: For each v, the correspondence s → Nv(s) is lower measurable
with respect to S.
For all r, let Φv(r) be the set of Q-measurable, density-weighted, equilibrium
payoﬀ selections as a function of q: speciﬁcally, f ∈ Ln
1 ≡ Ln
1(Q,Q,κ) belongs
to Φv(r) if and only if for κ-almost all q, f(q) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r), i.e., there is an
equilibrium payoﬀ vector y ∈ Pv(q,r) of the stage game induced by v at (q,r)
such that f(q) = h(r|q)y. Deﬁne Ev =
 
r Φv(r)λ∗(dr), the Bochner integral
of the correspondence r → Φv(r) with respect to the completion λ∗. The next
lemma establishes that the correspondence v → Ev maps to subsets of V .
Lemma 2: For each v, Ev ⊆ V .
Proof: Given v ∈ V , consider any f ∈ Ev. Then there exists an R∗-
measurable selection φ: R → Ln
1 such that φ(r) ∈ Φv(r) for λ∗-almost all r
and such that f =
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr). Moreover, for all r with φ(r) ∈ Φv(r) and
for κ-almost all q, φ(r)(q) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). By Aliprantis and Border’s (2006)
Theorem 11.47, part 1, there is a κ ⊗ λ∗-integrable function F : Q × R → ℜn
such that
(a) for λ∗-almost all r ∈ R, we have φ(r) = F( ,r) ∈ Ln
1









An implication of (a), with the fact that φ(r) ∈ Φv(r) for λ∗-almost all r, is
that for κ-almost all q and for λ∗-almost all r, F(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). With
(b), this implies that there is a Q-measurable set Q0 with κ(Q0) = 0 such that
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where the ﬁrst equality follows from f =
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr), the second equality from
(ii), the ﬁrst inequality from Jensen’s inequality (see Theorem 11.24 of Aliprantis
and Border (2006)), the second inequality from (i), and the last inequality from
the fact that h( |q) is a density. Of course
 
q ||f(q)||2κ(dq) < ∞. This implies
f ∈ V , and therefore Ev ⊆ V .
It remains to be shown that v → Ev has nonempty, convex values and closed
graph in the weak* topology. The next lemma, a key step in the proof, is Lemma
6 in Nowak and Raghavan (1992). It shows that for every open set G ⊆ ℜn, the
set {(q,r) ∈ S | Pv(q,r) ∩ G  = ∅} belongs to S and, therefore, also to Q ⊗ R.
Lemma 3: For each v, the correspondence (q,r) → Pv(q,r) is lower mea-
surable with respect to S, and therefore also with respect to Q ⊗ R∗.
An immediate implication of the preceding lemma, via the Kuratowski-Ryll-
Nardzewski selection theorem (see Theorem 18.13 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)), is that for each v, the correspondence (q,r) → Pv(q,r) admits a Q⊗R∗-
measurable selection. This implies, as stated in the next lemma, that v → Ev
has nonempty values.
Lemma 4: For each v, Ev  = ∅.
Proof: It suﬃces to deduce a Bochner integrable selection φ: R → Ln
1
such that φ(r) ∈ Φv(r) for λ∗-almost all r. By the previous lemma and the
Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewskiselection theorem, there exists a Q⊗R∗-measurable
mapping y: Q×R → ℜ satisfying y(q,r) ∈ Pv(q,r) for all q and all r. In partic-




r h(r|q)λ∗(dr)κ(dq) = 1,
and Tonelli’s theorem (see Theorem 11.28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006))




q h(r|q)κ(dq)λ∗(dr) = 1.
Therefore, it must be that for λ∗-almost all r, we have
 
q h(r|q)κ(dq) < ∞. Let
R0 be a R∗-measurable set with λ∗(R0) = 0 and such that for all r ∈ R \ R0,  
q h(r|q)κ(dq) < ∞. Deﬁne φ: R → Ln
1 so that φ(r) = 0 for r ∈ R0 and so
18that φ(r)(q) = h(r|q)y(q,r) for r ∈ R \ R0 and all q. Then φ(r) ∈ Φv(r) for
λ∗-almost all r, and h(r|q)y(q,r) is κ⊗λ∗-integrable, so Aliprantis and Border’s
(2006) Theorem 11.47, part 2, implies φ is Bochner integrable, as required.
To establish convex values and closed graph of v → Ev, it will be useful
to deﬁne the following auxiliary correspondence. For each v, let P ∗
v (s) denote
the convex hull of Pv(s), and let Φ∗
v(r) be the set of Q-measurable, density-
weighted, convex combinations of equilibrium payoﬀ selections as a function of
q: speciﬁcally, f ∈ Ln
1 belongs to Φ∗
v(r) if and only if for κ-almost all q, f(q) ∈
h(r|q)P ∗
v (q,r), i.e., there is a convex combination y ∈ P ∗
v (q,r) of equilibrium
payoﬀ vectors in the induced game such that f(q) = h(r|q)y. In contrast to
Φv(r), the set Φ∗
v(r) must be convex, a property that implies closed graph of
v → Φ∗
v(r) for all r, as stated in the next lemma, which is adapted from Lemma
7 of Nowak and Raghavan (1992).
Lemma 5: For all r, the correspondence v → Φ∗
v(r) has weak* closed graph.
Proof: The proof is exactly that of Nowak and Raghavan’s (1992) Lemma
7 after identifying our a with their x, our q with their s, our q′ with their
t, our  q( |s,a) with their q( |s,x), our Ui(q,r,a;v) (with r ﬁxed) with their
ui(s,x)(v), and our correspondence v → Φ∗
v(r) with their v → Mv.
The usefulness of the latter lemma lies in the fact that Ev can be written as







direction of this inclusion is obvious. For the less trivial ⊇ inclusion, we would
like to apply a version of Liapunov’s theorem for correspondences (e.g., Theo-
rem 4, p.64, of Hildenbrand (1974)) with respect to a nonatomic measure: for
correspondences mapping to ℜn, Liapunov’s theorem implies that the integral
of a correspondence with respect to a nonatomic measure is equal to the integral
of the convex hull of the correspondence. But Liapunov’s theorem does not hold
in inﬁnite-dimensional settings, so this direct avenue is not open. Instead, the
approach I use implicitly relies on the fact that the correspondence r → Φv(r)
has a product structure, in that Pv(q,r) is deﬁned independently for each q;
the selection of equilibrium payoﬀs in the induced game Γ(q,r) does not restrict
(beyond considerations of measurability) the selection at Γ(q′,r). This permits
the application of Liapunov’s theorem separately for each q.




integrals of the correspondence (q,r) → P ∗
v (q,r) deﬁned on (q,r) pairs. I then
apply Liapunov’s convexity theorem for correspondences mapping to subsets
of ℜn, integrating across r one q at a time. Finally the proof “goes up” to
the Bochner integral. A technical issue is that in the second step, we have
one integral
 
r Pv(q,r)h(r|q)λ∗(dr) for each q, and thus one selection from r →
h(r|q)Pv(q,r) for each q. To return to the Bochner integral, we have to “sew up”
these selections in a measurable way, a task simpliﬁed by a theorem of Artstein
(1989).12
12Alternatively, we can deduce this lemma from part 2 of the more general theorem of




Proof: Clearly, Ev ⊆
 
r Φ∗




so there exists a R∗-measurable mapping φ: R → Ln
1 such that φ(r) ∈ Φ∗
v(r)
for λ∗-almost all r and f =
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr). By Aliprantis and Border’s (2006)
Theorem 11.47, part 1, there is a κ ⊗ λ∗-integrable function F : Q × R → ℜn
satisfying (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma 2. An implication of (a), with
the fact that φ(r) ∈ Φ∗
v(r) for λ∗-almost all r, is that for κ-almost all q and for
λ∗-almost all r, F(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)P ∗
v (q,r). With (b), this implies that there is
a Q-measurable set Q0 with κ(Q0) = 0 such that for all q ∈ Q \ Q0, we have
(i) for λ∗-almost all r, F(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)P ∗
v (q,r), and (ii) (
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr))(q) =  












where the ﬁrst equality follows from f =
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr) and (ii), the inclusion
from (i), and the last equality from Hildenbrand’s (1974) Theorem 4 (p.64).
It follows that for κ-almost all q, f(q) ∈
 
r Pv(q,r)h(r|q)λ∗(dr). To apply the
theorem of Artstein (1989), note that Q and R are complete separable met-
ric spaces, and the correspondence (q,r) → Pv(q,r) is lower measurable with
respect to Q ⊗ R and has nonempty, compact values. Artstein’s theorem ap-
plies to integration with respect to Borel probability measures, but Theorem
10.35 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) implies that every R∗-measurable se-
lection from r → Pv(q,r) is equivalent to an R-measurable function λ-almost
everywhere. Thus, for κ-almost all q, f(q) ∈
 
r Pv(q,r)h(r|q)λ(dr). Lastly, for
all q, ||
 
r h(r|q)Pv(q,r)λ(dr)|| ≤ C, so the correspondence r → h(r|q)Pv(q,r) is
λ-integrably bounded. Then Artstein’s theorem yields a S-measurable mapping
G: Q × R → ℜ such that for κ-almost all q, f(q) =
 
r G(q,r)λ(dr) and for λ-
almost all r, G(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). In particular, G is Q⊗R∗-measurable, and
is in fact κ ⊗ λ∗-integrable, and f(q) =
 
r G(q,r)λ∗(dr) for κ-almost all q. By
Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Theorem 11.47, part 2, the mapping ψ: R → Ln
1













r ψ(r)λ∗(dr). Furthermore, ψ(r) ∈ Φv(r) for λ∗-almost all r, and we
conclude that f ∈
 
r Φv(r)λ∗(dr) = Ev, as required.
The preceding lemma immediately implies that the correspondence v → Ev
is convex-valued.
Lemma 7: For each v, Ev is convex.
We can now establish that the correspondence v → Ev has closed graph by
Mertens (2003). The proof of Lemma 6 here is straightforward relative to Mertens’ proof.
20an application of a version of Fatou’s lemma on upper hemicontinuity of the
integral of Banach-valued correspondences, due to Yannelis (1990).
Lemma 8: The correspondence v → Ev has closed graph.
Proof: Note that (R,R∗,λ∗) is a complete, ﬁnite measure space, and Ln
2 is
a Banach space with the usual norm. Furthermore, since Q is a separable met-
ric space, it follows that Ln
2 is separable in the norm topology. (See Theorem
8.3.27 of Corbae et al. (2009).) A further implication, by Aliprantis and Border’s
(2006) Theorem 6.30, is that V is metrizable in the weak* topology. Further-
more, the correspondence r → Φ∗
v(r) has nonempty, convex values, and Φ∗
v(r)
is closed in Ln
2 with the weak* topology and, therefore, in the norm topology.
Thus, the background conditions of Yannelis’s (1990) Theorem 3.2 are satisﬁed.
For ﬁxed r, we have seen that the correspondence v → Φ∗
v(r) has weak* closed
graph, fulﬁlling condition (i) of the latter theorem; and the correspondence has
weak* compact range and is integrably bounded by the function taking the con-
stant value C, fulﬁlling condition (ii). Thus, Theorem 3.2 of Yannelis (1990)
implies that v →
 
r Φ∗
v(r)λ∗(dr) = Ev has weak* closed graph, as required.
By the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg theorem, there exists a ﬁxed point v ∈ Ev.
The ﬁnal step of the proof is to construct a stationary Markov perfect equilib-
rium. Let φ: R → Ln
1 be an R∗-measurable mapping such that φ(r) ∈ Φv(r)
for λ∗-almost all r and such that v =
 
r φ(r)λ∗(dr). Let F : Q × R → ℜn be
a Q ⊗ R∗-measurable function satisfying (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma
2. In particular, for λ∗-almost all r, F( ,r) ∈ Φv(r), and for κ-almost all
q, v(q) =
 
r F(q,r)λ∗(dr). The former condition implies there is a Q ⊗ R∗-
measurable set S0 with (κ⊗λ∗)(S0) = 0 and such that for all s = (q,r) ∈ S\S0,
we have F(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). Recalling that ν = κ ⊗ λ, Aliprantis and Bor-
der’s (2006) Theorem 10.47 implies that the product sigma-algebra Q ⊗ R∗ is
contained in the sigma-algebra of ν-measurable sets, denoted S∗, and there-
fore F is measurable with respect to S∗. By Theorem 10.35 of Aliprantis and
Border (2006), there is a S-measurable mapping G: Q × R → ℜn such that
G(q,r) = F(q,r) for ν-almost all (q,r). In particular, for κ-almost all q, we have
v(q) =
 
r G(q,r)λ(dr), and there is a S-measurable set S1 with S0 ⊆ S1 and
ν(S1) = 0 such that for all (q,r) ∈ S\S1, we have G(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r). Using
the fact that (q,r) → Pv(q,r) is lower measurable with respect to S, and there-
fore admits a S-measurable selection, we can specify that G(q,r) ∈ h(r|q)Pv(q,r)
for all (q,r) ∈ S1 as well.
Recall that U( ;v): S ×
 
i P(Xi) → ℜn is a Caratheodory function, i.e.,
U(s,α;v) is jointly measurable in (s,α) and is continuous in α, and that s →
Nv(s) is lower measurable with respect to S. Moreover, for all s = (q,r), there
exists α ∈ Nv(s) such that G(q,r) = h(r|q)U(q,r,α;v). Then Filippov’s implicit
function theorem (see Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Theorem 18.17) yields a S-
measurable function ξ: S →
 
i P(Xi) such that for all s, we have ξ(s) ∈ Nv(s)
and G(s) = h(r|q)U(s,ξ(s);v). Deﬁne the strategy σi: S → P(Xi) for each
player i so that for all s, σi(s) is the marginal of ξ(s) on Xi, and write σ(s) for
21ξ(s), the product of the players’ mixed strategies. By Aliprantis and Border’s
(2006) Theorem 19.7, σi: S → P(Xi) is indeed measurable, so these strategies
are well-deﬁned.























where s = (q,r). Now deﬁne w ∈ Ln





























so w satisﬁes the recursion that uniquely deﬁnes v( ;σ). Therefore, w = v( ;σ).
Furthermore, using (1), continuation values can be written in terms of payoﬀs


























for all i and all s. Therefore, σ is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
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